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Part 2: Current Trends
in Economic Research
on Systemic Risk
conference session on current research directions featured 
three papers examining market-based crises—crises in 
which financial institutions are affected by shocks that 
propagate through asset prices and market liquidity.1 In these 
crisis models, shocks affect financial institutions through the 
prices of securities that the institutions hold in common—not 
through chains of connections between institutions, as in a 
payments network.
While market-oriented models of financial crises differ 
from the traditional bank-oriented models in the way 
shocks are propagated, they share with bank models the 
possibility of multiple equilibria and transitions driven by 
positive feedback. Thus, a shock can cause a transition from 
a normal state to a crisis state from which the system need 
not recover endogenously. Indeed, the models often feature 
path-dependent behavior in which the transition out of a 
crisis state entails a path different from the one leading to 
the crisis and may require some form of external inter-
vention. These characteristics of market-based models—
and the dynamics of the models more generally—are the 
subject of the three papers presented.
1The large literature on systemic risk and financial crisis cannot be represented 
in any set of three papers. The papers in this session of the conference were 
selected to illustrate current thinking about financial crises that propagate 
through securities markets (for example, the bond and stock markets). Further, 
the conference organizers sought out analytical or theoretical papers that 
would show the conceptual underpinning of the literature on financial crises; 
empirical analyses of financial crises were not included.
As the discussion that followed the presentations made 
clear, the papers open some potentially productive new 
avenues for research. More insight is needed into how 
financial markets recover from crisis states and what 
policies or regulatory regimes would speed that recovery 
and contribute to a more robust financial system.2 A related 
issue that merits further research is the trade-off in risk 
management practices between the objective of limiting 
risk ex ante and the effects of risk management constraints 
in the midst of a crisis. For instance, mark-to-market 
accounting is a risk management practice that makes trading 
performance transparent and prevents managers and 
traders from concealing losses while trying to gamble their 
way out of losing positions.3 Further, marking to market the 
value of trading positions, combined with risk management 
loss limits that force a closeout of a losing position, can 
prevent a loss from becoming large enough to bring down 
a firm. (Some bank failures and catastrophic investment 
fund losses are attributable to the failure to adhere to this 
basic risk management discipline.) However, as the papers 
presented suggest, the collective and mechanical exercise 
of such discipline on a widespread scale after a large market 
shock can create the type of liquidity spiral that leads to a 
market crisis.
2For examples of research on these issues, see Allen and Gale (1994, 2005) 
and Holmstrom and Tirole (1998). 
3Mark-to-market accounting requires that the value of an investment, which 
might vary over the period for which it is held, be assigned the current market 
price of such an investment. 
The views expressed in this summary do not necessarily reflect the position 
of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System. 
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Wealth Transfers and Portfolio 
Constraints
The first paper, by Anna Pavlova of the London Business 
School and Roberto Rigobon of MIT (presented by Rigobon), 
examined the transmission of shocks between countries with 
cross-border trade and investment. Pavlova and Rigobon 
(2006) began studying this issue after they uncovered a 
divergence of views on a simple question: Would it be good for 
the stock market in the United States if the dollar depreciated? 
They found that the answer depended on whether the initial 
shock was a supply or a demand shock and also on the effects 
of wealth redistribution arising from the changes in the relative 
prices of goods and financial assets. The presentation focused 
on how a shock plays out in the real side of the economy and in 
the financial system and how the two sectors interact through 
the effects of wealth redistribution.
The paper highlights the ways in which financial market 
imperfections and institutional features of the financial system 
affect the transmission of shocks across countries. The model 
presented has a center country and two peripheral countries; 
significantly, it also includes a constraint on the center 
country’s financial sector that can be interpreted as a risk 
management constraint on that country’s investors—for 
instance, a constraint against concentration risk. With this 
model, Pavlova and Rigobon seek to understand how the 
exchange rates, interest rates, and stock markets in the three 
countries evolve in response to shocks. Is there comovement in 
asset prices of the peripheral countries and, if so, does it depend 
on the tightness of the constraint? The analysis uses a general 
equilibrium framework that illuminates the role of wealth 
redistribution in the transmission of shocks.4
In the model, the constraint creates a common risk factor or 
covariation in stock prices and terms of trade (the exchange 
rate). In the presence of shocks, the portfolio constraint leads 
to wealth transfers that create comovement among the terms of 
trade and stock prices in the peripheral countries, while 
reducing the comovement between the stock markets of the 
center country and the peripheral countries. These results are 
4In a general equilibrium analysis, all decision makers behave optimally relative 
to others (subject to constraints such as budget limitations), and supply and 
demand in all markets are in balance at the equilibrium prices.
consistent with empirical findings documenting contagion 
among the stock prices and exchange rates of countries 
belonging to the same asset class (for example, emerging 
markets). One of the model’s implications for policy is that 
during a crisis, interventions that relax the portfolio constraint 
in the center country’s financial system could be a more 
effective response to a systemic crisis than providing assistance 
to the country suffering the initial shock. The alleviation of the 
constraint short-circuits the wealth transfers that transmit the 
shock to others, reducing the likelihood of contagion.
Risk and Liquidity
in a System Context
Hyun Song Shin of Princeton University examined how 
liquidity shocks can propagate through the linkages between 
balance sheets of financial institutions and securities prices. 
The starting point of Shin’s (2006) analysis is the fact that most 
of the assets on the balance sheets of financial institutions are 
claims against other parties. This fact leads to interesting and 
possibly complex interrelationships in which asset prices can 
fluctuate together. How creditworthy one party’s liabilities are 
depends on the strength of the assets on its balance sheet, which 
in turn depends on the creditworthiness of other parties’ 
liabilities, and so on.
In Shin’s analysis, the financial system is a system of inter-
linked balance sheets. An objective of the study is to analyze 
fluctuations in apparent risk appetites that arise endogenously 
from solvency constraints and financial institutions’ inter-
linked balance sheets. In the model, all assets are marked to 
market, and economic agents are assumed to be risk neutral 
so that the analyst can observe how asset prices respond to the 
liquidity effects arising from market participants’ interlinked 
balance sheets, rather than to changes in risk preferences or 
risk aversion.
In the model, the market value of each firm’s debt depends 
on the value of the firm’s assets. Since some of these assets are 
the debt of other firms, linkages arise in the value of the debt 
of all the firms. An equilibrium is a fixed point of these asset 
value equations. With the addition to the model of a target 
leverage ratio determined by, for instance, a risk management 
constraint, financial institutions will shrink or expand their 
balance sheets in response to shocks to their capital—actions 
that will set off liquidity drains and lending booms. In this 
model, supply and demand curves have counterintuitive 
shapes, and a fall in prices can actually increase the supply of 
assets. In such a case, a negative shock to bank capital raises a 
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bank’s leverage ratio above its target; to reduce leverage, the 
bank must sell assets. These sales depress prices even more, 
causing a further negative shock to all banks’ capital and 
setting in motion additional asset sales and a downward spiral 
in asset prices.
A policy-related implication of this analysis is the potential 
for feedback effects to arise from mark-to-market accounting. 
Now that a much wider range of assets can be marked to 
market, will such an accounting convention enhance stability 
or undermine it? Accounting is absolutely crucial for thinking 
about incentive problems because gains and losses are 
recognized on the balance sheet, and it is the unit of account 
that drives decisions.
In thinking about systemic risk, Shin considers the 
difference between domino effects and price effects. In domino 
scenarios, shocks propagate between banks through the payments 
system or through cascading defaults. Price effects, however, can 
propagate shocks even when no balance sheet or payment linkages 
exist. Further, price effects operate even in the absence of large 
players. Price changes are a lightning rod that coordinates 
expectations and actions and that affects the system through the 
similarity of positions across firms regardless of firm size or the 
lack of direct linkages between the firms.
Market Liquidity and Funding 
Liquidity
In the session’s last paper, Markus Brunnermeier of Princeton 
University (presenter) and Lasse Pedersen of New York University 
explored the relationship between market liquidity and funding 
liquidity, giving particular attention to how they interact through 
risk management practices at financial institutions. Market 
liquidity is the ease of trading an asset and is asset-specific, while 
funding liquidity is the availability of funds and is agent- or 
borrower-specific. Brunnermeier and Pedersen’s (2006) paper 
links the two liquidity concepts by arguing that they are mutually 
reinforcing: when funding liquidity is abundant, traders have the 
resources to finance trading positions that smooth out price 
shocks, and markets will be liquid. This process is self-reinforcing 
because liquid markets are less volatile and assets become better 
collateral—conditions that lead to a relaxation of funding 
constraints on trading activity. This feedback loop is what 
Brunnermeier and Pedersen set out to study.
They construct a model that would explain four stylized 
facts about market liquidity. The first fact is the most 
important one for the systemic risk question—the sudden loss 
or fragility of liquidity. Second is the commonality of liquidity 
and the way market liquidity comoves across different assets. 
Third is the apparent correlation between liquidity and 
volatility: whenever volatility is high, liquidity is low. The last is 
the flight-to-quality phenomenon, whereby traders flock to 
low-volatility securities when their capital is eroded, causing 
the liquidity of riskier assets to deteriorate.
In the model, a market liquidity shock is defined as the price 
deviation from the fair value of an asset. To examine 
endogenous illiquidity effects, the researchers assume that 
offsetting liquidity shocks exist: thus, in the initial period, a 
liquidity shock causes the price to deviate from fair value and, 
in the subsequent period, an offsetting shock occurs that 
restores the price to its initial fair value.5 In addition to 
liquidity shocks, a source of risk in the model is a fundamental 
shock that changes the fair value of the asset. Traders in the 
model buy and sell securities in an attempt to profit from the 
liquidity shocks and, in so doing, provide liquidity to the 
market. This liquidity provision is risky, however, because of 
the fundamental shocks that change the fair value of the asset. 
Traders are constrained by their net worth and need to finance 
their trading positions subject to a margin or “haircut” on the 
amount they can borrow, where the margin is a credit risk 
mitigation device imposed by the lender and is determined by 
the volatility of the fundamental value of the asset. The traders 
face funding liquidity risk because a fall in their net worth or a 
rise in the margin required for trading positions may deprive 
them of funds needed for trading.
In this model, the relationship between the margin 
requirement and the asset’s price and volatility will influence 
whether equilibrium outcomes with fragile market liquidity 
and illiquidity spirals occur. Trader losses from price shocks 
can lead to self-perpetuating falls in market liquidity as trading 
is endogenously curtailed because of the difficulty of funding 
the margin required for trading positions.
5Liquidity shocks are price shocks that are unrelated to fundamental value. 
For example, an investor may sell bonds to meet a need for cash, placing down-
ward pressure on the bond price; at a different moment, an investor who has 
experienced a cash windfall may buy bonds, producing an opposite effect on 
the price.
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Discussion
Herdlike Behavior and Incentives
for Contrarian Trading Strategies
The three papers presented in this conference session 
highlighted the positive feedback effects that produce herdlike 
behavior in markets, and the subsequent discussion focused 
in part on means of encouraging heterogeneous investment 
strategies to counter such behavior. Investors who sit on the 
sidelines during boom times will not be weakened by the 
inevitable downturn and will be well positioned to profit by 
entering the market to buy assets at distressed prices. Such 
contrarian investment behavior would mitigate the sort of 
systemic collapse that was analyzed in the papers presented. 
A number of conference participants asked, what incentives for 
this type of stabilizing behavior do fund managers have? Would 
fund managers who were content to hold cash and low-yielding 
liquid assets when the markets were flourishing be able to 
convince their investors to stay with them when everyone else 
was earning tremendous profits riding the upside of a bubble? 
Which investors are willing to earn very little in anticipation of 
realizing high returns by purchasing undervalued assets after a 
market crash?
If it is costly to hold liquid assets in order to be a buyer and 
to provide liquidity in a market crash, why would anyone 
choose to do it? In an equilibrium analysis that accounts for the 
incentives to sit on the sidelines in a boom, the market crash 
must be big enough to assure liquidity providers that they will 
earn sufficient profits buying at distressed prices to compensate 
them for forgone profits. So, in the absence of government or 
central bank intervention, the paradox is that the inducement 
to adopt contrarian investment strategies is greater when the 
severity of the crash is greater.6
6Allen and Gale (1994, 2005) study these issues.
The conference participants discussed the role the central 
bank or government might play in encouraging the sort of 
contrarian behavior that would stabilize failing markets. 
Collateralized lending by the central bank could be one way to 
short-circuit the feedback in asset prices and distress-driven 
selling of those assets; investors could acquire liquidity by 
borrowing against assets instead of selling them.7 However, the 
type of assets that investors might want to offer as collateral 
could be different from the asset types normally used as 
collateral when borrowing from the central bank—especially in 
a situation in which investors’ best assets have already been 
used in collateralized borrowing from the markets. Further, 
there could also be incentive effects—such as moral hazard—
that change behavior in boom times in undesirable ways. If 
investors anticipate that illiquidity would be mitigated in a 
crash, they may have even more reason to ignore the risks in 
an emerging price bubble.
Another policy option mentioned in the discussion in this 
session would be to change reserve requirements and capital 
requirements to counteract the positive feedback effects—that 
is, to raise requirements in boom times and lower them in bad 
times. Alternatively, when markets are prospering, banks could 
be required to increase their liquid asset holdings so that they 
can provide liquidity more effectively when markets fail. The 
problem here, of course, is that these requirements act like a tax 
on these institutions, and taxes are always unpopular and 
would place the institutions at a disadvantage relative to other 
market participants—at least in the good times.
The Range of Economic Models
in the Study of Systemic Risk
Participants in the session also discussed the types of models 
used to study systemic risk and commented on the challenges 
and trade-offs researchers face in developing their models. One 
type of model is the falling domino model. When applied to 
data on the linkages among banks through interbank loans and 
exposures in the payments system, for example, the model is 
used to study how cascading losses following the collapse of 
a bank propagate through the banking or payments system. 
In such an event, what would happen to other banks and how 
would liquidity in the payments system be affected? Another 
type of model takes into account the optimal behavior of 
market participants in analyses of their response to shocks. 
7Examples of such liquidity provision are the discount window lending 
facilities at central banks that provide emergency liquidity to banks, and the 
repo options that the Federal Reserve made available to nonbanks to address 
concerns about liquidity shocks associated with the Y2K vulnerability in 
computing systems.
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These models can be general equilibrium or game-theoretic 
models: the former look at the interaction between financial 
asset markets through, say, investors’ portfolio choices; the 
latter examine strategic interaction between economic agents 
in which agents act in anticipation of how others will behave. 
In addition, the models can be either comparative static models 
or dynamic models: the former analyze differences between the 
pre-shock and post-shock equilibrium states of the financial 
system, while the latter examine what occurs in the transition 
from one equilibrium state to the other.
The work by Pavlova and Rigobon is representative of the 
current literature on international crises involving exchange 
rates and cross-border shocks to financial systems and 
economic activity. The studies by Shin and by Brunnermeier 
and Pedersen are illustrative of the models that look at feedback 
effects to clarify the interactions between market prices and the 
behavior of financial institutions. These papers highlight the 
importance of the financial system’s institutional features—
mark-to-market accounting, margin requirements in trading, 
and risk management constraints more generally—to an 
understanding of systemic risk. The papers are stripped-down 
approaches examining the equilibrium of a system of price 
determination equations to simplify the analysis of feedback 
effects. Adding to the analysis a consideration of heterogeneity 
among investment strategies, as in the discussion above, 
increases the complexity of the effort considerably. For 
instance, one could step back and ask how investors would 
choose their initial portfolios if they anticipated the feedback 
effects and linked sequences of events in possible future 
scenarios. Or one could ask what incentives or compensation 
arrangements would motivate an investor or fund manager to 
act on that anticipation.
The challenge in these and other models is the trade-off 
between analytical tractability and realism. Given the current 
state of the art, significant simplification and abstraction are 
required to build models that can be used to answer practical 
questions. Yet the simplicity of a model by its nature means 
that potentially important factors can be missed. Indeed, a key 
goal of the conference was to determine whether there are 
modeling techniques in other disciplines that can deal with 
complexity yet still keep sight of the important features of the 
system under study.
Adequacy of Buffers against Systemic
Shocks in the Financial System
A third discussion topic that drew considerable interest was 
whether competitive pressures and risk management practices 
are undermining the robustness of the financial system. More 
sophisticated methods of assessing collateral and margin 
requirements in the financing of trading positions may be 
lowering the overall margin and collateral amounts held 
against these exposures. For instance, the use of portfolio 
margining allows the netting and offsetting of positions and 
results in a lower margin on posted collateral. Certainly, the 
technique has advantages: netting of margin across gaining and 
losing positions in a portfolio can alleviate the liquidity shocks 
from margin-driven selling of the losing position, reducing the 
positive feedback effects analyzed above. At the same time, 
however, portfolio margining reduces the amount of overall 
margin, resulting in a smaller cushion if correlated shocks 
occur simultaneously across the whole range of margined 
investments.
A critical risk management issue here is the treatment of 
correlation assumptions in determining margin amounts for a 
portfolio of diverse assets. Correlations among asset prices can 
change radically in a crisis. A conference participant observed 
that truly sophisticated risk managers would set portfolio 
margin requirements that take into account how those 
correlations can change in a crisis, and not look myopically at 
the average correlations of the last three years. Whether such an 
approach would be rewarded, however, brings us back to the 
earlier discussion of incentives and contrarian behavior: Do 
risk managers have meaningful incentives to use conservative 
portfolio margin requirements when their competitors are 
basing their margins on optimistic assumptions about 
correlations of margined positions?
Participants in the session also discussed 
the types of models used to study 
systemic risk and commented on the 
challenges and trade-offs researchers 
face in developing their models.References
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